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Ex POST FACTO LAWS
Constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws' are
predicated upon the general idea that criminal laws shall not be
given retroactive effect so as to subsequently make an act crim-
inal which was legal when done, to increase the penalty after a
crime has been committed, or to make any other change in the
law which will operate to the detriment of the accused. 2 The
broad construction usually given this prohibition is shown by
the West Virginia case of State v. Fisher,3 where the court held
that an indeterminate sentence law, providing for possible pro-
bation after the minimum sentence was served, was ex post facto
and therefore could not be applied to crimes committed before
its enactment.
In State v. Masino4 the Louisiana Supreme Court was con-
fronted with two very difficult aspects of the ex post facto doc-
trine. Prior to the effective date of the 1942 Criminal Code, the
defendant contractors had installed gas pipes in a grossly negli-
gent manner. This negligence resulted in a leakage, and in Feb-
ruary, 1946, the accumulation of gas under the project resulted
in a violent explosion which caused the death of several persons.
At the time of the defendants' negligent installation, a homicide
resulting from criminal negligence would have constituted man-
slaughter with a maximum penalty of twenty years imprison-
ment. At the time of the explosion and death the Criminal Code
had changed this type of involuntary manslaughter to negligent
homicide,5 carrying a maximum penalty of five years imprison-
ment. The defendants, who had been tried and found guilty of
negligent homicide, based their appeal principally upon the argu-
ment that the application of the new negligent homicide article
to them was in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto
laws.
The first question was whether or not the reduction of the
offense from manslaughter to negligent homicide amounted to
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The United States Constitution prohibits the passage of ex post facto
laws by Congress and by the legislatures of the several states, (U.S. Const.
Art. I, § 10); Accord: La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 15.
2. For a further explanation of what is meant by ex post facto laws see
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
3. 126 W. Va. 117, 27 S.E. 2d 581 (1943).
4. 216 La. 352, 43 So. 2d 685 (1949).
5. Art. 32, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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an ex post facto law, that is, was a change detrimental to the
accused. Relying largely upon the Criminal Code comment that
a conviction would be easier to obtain under the new negligent
homicide article than under the old crime of manslaughter, the
majority of the supreme court concluded that the change was
detrimental to the accused. This approach to the problem is
supported by the Fisher case, where the possibility that a gen-
erally more liberal provision might work a detriment by induc-
ing longer sentences was considered sufficient for application of
the ex post facto doctrine.
It is further supported by a specific provision of the Loui-
siana Criminal Code. Article 142 states that crimes committed
before the code should be governed by the law existing at the
time of their commission. This article draws a definite line as to
the applicability of the new crimes, which is not dependent upon
whether the change effected by the Criminal Code was detri-
mental or beneficial within the meaning of the ex post facto
prohibition.
A second and even more difficult problem which confronted
the court in the Masino case was that of what time should control
as to defendants' liability. Should it be the time of defendants'
negligent act, which preceded the Criminal Code; or should it be
the time when the criminal consequence (explosion resulting in
death) occurred, which was several years after the effective date
of the code? The majority opinion said that the time of the crime
was the time of the defendants' act even though the criminal
consequence occurred at a later date. The dissenting justices, on
the other hand, took the view that the crime did not occur until
the offense was consummated by the explosion and death. Prior
to that date the defendants had been negligent, but criminal lia-
bility had not and could not have attached.
As an independent theoretical proposition it may have been
more difficult to relate the criminal consequence back to the time
of the defendants' act than it would have been to treat the defen-
dants' negligence as continuing until the resultant explosion and
deaths.6 However, the decision achieves a sound practical result
in holding that the defendants' criminal liability shall be meas-
ured by the law at the time they acted (by negligently laying the
pipes), regardless of the time when the criminal consequence




occurred.' At the same time it gives logical effect to the inter-
related provisions of Article 142 of the Criminal Code and the
general ex post facto prohibition. It would be unusual if, in a
legal pattern so complex as that fashioned to meet the needs of
the Masino case, there were not a few loose ends in the court's
reasoning. As we strive for a more precise analysis of Justice
Moise's majority opinion, we are reminded of that able jurist's
poignant statement, in another troublesome case, that "It is easier




Prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1942, Louisiana
statutes provided only a random coverage of attempts to commit
crimes. In the absence of a specific attempt provision, the of-
fender who merely attempted to commit an offense was outside
the ambit of criminal responsibility. Article 27, which is one of
the most significant articles of the Criminal Code, provides gen-
erally for the inchoate offense of Attempt. It embraces all at-
tempts to commit crimes, whether the intended crime be a felony
or a misdemeanor. In State v. Broadnax9 the supreme court up-
held the application of the attempt article to a narcotic law vio-
lation, a crime which is denounced by the Narcotic Drug Act.' 0
Defense counsel's argument that the attempt article should be
limited to those crimes stated in the Criminal Code was squarely
overruled. In holding that the article was of a general nature
and applicable to all crimes, whether prescribed in the Criminal
Code or in other statutes, the supreme court stressed the code's
definition of a "crime" as "Conduct which is criminal in this Code,
or in other acts of the legislature. . . ." The court also considered
the redactor's comments, printed as footnotes to the articles by
legislative direction, which show that Article 27 was intended as
a general provision, punishing all attempts to commit crimes. In
this regard, it is significant that all of the general provisions of
Title I of the Criminal Code were enacted as a codification of
existing general criminal law principles, but with such changes
and extensions as were necessary to round out a workable pattern
of substantive criminal law. The statement of a general attempt
concept was one of those necessary extensions.
7. For an original and very clear exposition of this thesis, see student
note to Masino case, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 539 (1950).
8. State v. Masino, 214 La. 744-748, 38 So. 2d 622, 623 (1949).
9. 216 La. 1003, 45 So. 2d 604 (1950).
10. La. Act 14 of 1934 (2 E.S.), §§ 2, 20, as amended by La. Act 416 of
1948 (La. R.S. [1950] 40:962, 40:981).
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MANSLAUGHTER-ILLEGAL ARREST AS PROVOCATION
In State v. Simpson," defense counsel had requested a charge
that the jury should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter,
rather than murder, if they found that he killed the deceased
while resisting an illegal arrest. This requested charge was predi-
cated upon the frequently stated common law principle that an
unlawful arrest "is so grievous an assault that it is regarded as
sufficient provocation to reduce a homicide in resisting it to
manslaughter. '12 The draftsmen of the Criminal Code found it
impracticable to specify what would and what would not be suffi-
cient provocation to reduce an intentional killing from murder to
manslaughter. For example, mere insulting words, a moderate
blow, or adultery with a daughter or sister, standing alone, had
not usually been considered as a sufficient provocation; and yet a
combination of these factors might well be sufficient to reduce the
homicide to manslaughter. Similarly, while a rude unlawful
arrest would ordinarily be adequate provocation, a polite and
non-offensive attempt to arrest should not be sufficient to cause
a sudden passion or heat of blood even though the arrest was
unlawful in nature. Realizing the futility of specifying what
would or what would not be adequate provocation as a matter of
law, it was decided that "reasonable provocation" should be left
as a jury question. Adopting this intended construction, as shown
by the Reporter's Comment 13 to Article 31 (1), the supreme court
held that whether an illegal arrest would constitute sufficient
provocation to reduce the killing to manslaughter was a question
of fact for the jury.
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE--CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Negligent Homicide is defined as the killing of a human
being "by criminal negligence. 1 4 Criminal negligence is some-
thing more than mere ordinary negligence which would impose
civil liability in a wrongful death action. It has been variously
characterized by common law jurisprudence and by statutes to
require "gross," "wanton," "willful," and "culpable" negligence.
1 5
11. 216 La. 212, 43 So. 2d 585 (1949).
12. Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes, 314 (4 ed. 1940).
13. "Adequate provocation:
"In common with a majority of the statutes in other states, the proposed
manslaughter article has defined the offense without a detailed enumeration
of what shall or shall not be considered adequate provocation. It is a matter
dependent upon so many and varying circumstances that a stereotyped classi-
fication would be impracticable. The adequacy of provocation will be pri-
marily a jury question .. "
14. Art. 32, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
15. Miller, Criminal Law, 287 (1934).
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Following a similar pattern, Article 12 of the Criminal Code has
defined criminal negligence to require "a gross deviation below
the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonable
careful man under like circumstances." It is the general practice
of trial judges to instruct juries concerning the nature of crim-
inal negligence by reading the clear and explicit language of the
definition of Article 12. Sometimes the court adds the further
explanation that criminal negligence involves a high degree of
carelessness and that lack of ordinary care which might support
a tort action for damages will not necessarily serve as a basis of
criminal liability. In State v. Brown,16 a negligent homicide
prosecution based upon the driving of an automobile at an unduly
high rate of speed, the supreme court affirmed the trial judge's
refusal to give a special charge to the jury that, "Criminal negli-
gence is the greatest type of negligence known to law. It is more
than a rashly negligent, careless, and heedless act." The requested
charge, and especially the second sentence thereof, would have
imposed an unjustified burden of proof upon the prosecution.
The words "rashly negligent" and "heedless" are similar in mean-
ing to the definition of criminal negligence provided in Article 12
of the Criminal Code, and it would have been clearly inaccurate
to say that criminal negligence required "more than a rashly
negligent, careless, and heedless act."
ISSUING WORTHLESS CHECKS
Issuing Worthless Checks, as defined by Article 71 of the
Criminal Code, was a substantial restatement of the 1914 "bad
check" statute.17 Reporters for the Criminal Code originally pro-
posed a definition of the offense which would have covered the
giving of a worthless check in payment of an antecedent debt. 8
However, upon a suggestion of the advisory committee, they re-
turned to the former Louisiana and usual requirement that the
offender must issue the check in exchange for something of value.
Relying upon the total absence of this element of criminal lia-
bility, the supreme court set aside a conviction of issuing a
worthless check in State v. McLean. 9 Defendant had received
delivery of a quantity of bananas. Three days later, after invoices
for the purchase price were received from the seller, defendant
issued his check in payment of the purchase price, knowing at
the time that he did not have sufficient -funds in the bank for the
16. 217 La. 373, 46 So. 2d 302 (1950).
17. La. Act 209 of 1914.
18. See Reporter's Comment to Art. 71, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
19. 216 La. 670, 44 So. 2d 698 (1950).
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payment of the same. Taking the view that the unconditional
delivery of the bananas without immediate payment constituted
a sale on credit, the supreme court held that the issuance of the
check was not "in exchange for" the bananas, but "was in pay-
ment for an antecedent debt, a transaction which Article 71 of the
Criminal Code does not denounce. '20
Justice Hamiter added, by way of dictum, "And on the issu-
ance of the check, the vendor is not by the check defrauded; the
fraud, if any, occurred when credit was extended."21 This sug-
gests that the state might still prosecute for Theft of the bananas
under Article 67 of the Criminal Code, which covers the taking
of another's property "by means of fraudulent conduct, practices,
or representations," if they could show that the defendant.had a
fraudulent intent at the time possession and title to the bananas
was delivered by the fruit company. 22 Such fraud at the incep-
tion of the transaction would be quite difficult to prove. At least,
it could hardly be established by the mere subsequent giving of
a worthless check in payment of the purchase price.
The McLean case, which was correctly decided under the
present bad check provision, raises a question as to whether
there might not be sound reasons for extending the offense so as
to include the issuing of a worthless check in payment of an ante-
cedent debt.
23
OPERATION OF BLIND TIGER
State v. Kolb24 involved difficult problems as to the present
vitality and scope of the Blind Tiger Act.25 Appellant had been
convicted of operating a blind tiger in his drug store in dry terri-
tory. The first question presented was whether the blind tiger
law had been repealed by the repeal of the state's general prohi-
bition law, the Hood Act, in 1933.26 It appeared to be the general
judicial consensus in the ten opinions written after three hear-
ings that the Blind Tiger Act had been dormant during 1933-1935
20. 216 La. 670, 675, 44 So. 2d 698, 700.
21. 216 La. 670, 675, 44 So. 2d 698, 699.
22. See Reporter's Comment to Art. 67, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
23. For such a provision, see Mo.. Stat. Ann. (1932) 2998, § 4305.
24. 217 La. 14, 45 So. 2d 891 (1949).
25. La. Act 8 of 1914 (E.S.) (La. R.S. [1950] 26:711-713). The section pro-
viding the penalty for violations and for the disposition of beverages seized
(La. R.S. [1950] 26:712) was amended and reenacted by La. Act 299 of 1950.
A "blind tiger" is defined as "any place in those subdivisions of the state
in which the sale of alcoholic beverages is prohibited where such beverages
are kept for sale, barter, or exchange or habitual giving away, whether in
connection with a business conducted at the place or not." La. R.S. (1950)
27:711.
26. La. Act 1 of 1933 (E.S.), repealing La. Act 39 of 1921 (E.S.).
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when prohibition was entirely repealed, but became operative
after the enactment in 1935 of a Local Option Law,27 under which
certain parishes of the state had voted to prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquors.28
The second, and most controversial question in the Kolb case
was whether a duly licensed drug store operating in dry territory
can be classed as a "Blind Tiger" when intoxicating liquor is
kept there for sale under a permit granted in accordance with
specific provisions of the Local Option Law. 29 Both Chief Justice
Fournet, writing the majority opinion after the first rehearing,
and Justices Moise and LeBlanc, writing for the majority of the
court after the second rehearing, took the view that the Blind
Tiger -Act, insofar as it now applied to those parishes which had
been voted dry at local option elections, was modified by the pro-
visions of the 1935 Local Option Act, which expressly authorized
the state to grant permits or licenses to druggists for the keeping
of liquor for sales for medicinal purposes pursuant to prescriptions
of licensed physicians. In brief, parishes could not prohibit the
sale of liquor for proper medicinal purposes under Section 2 of
the latter act, and a licensed druggist could not be held to be
operating a Blind Tiger when he kept intoxicating liquors in his
store under a license issued under Section 3. The abuse of such
permits by unlawful sales would be punishable under the appro-
priate section of the Local Option Law but would not, according
to the court, render the drug store a "Blind Tiger.
's0
A further question may be raised as to what effect the 1948
Local Option Statute3 ' may have upon the supreme court's hold-
ing in this case. The 1948 statute, which clearly supplanted and
superseded the 1935 act,32 omitted the special medicinal sale and
druggist licensing permissive provisions found in the earlier
statute. Possibly this may not have any effect upon the decision,
since Justice Moise's majority opinion, after the second rehear-
ing, stressed the significance of the word "blind" in the Blind
27. La. Act 17 of 1935 (1 E.S.).
28. For a very clear exposition of this issue in the case, which was more
or less taken for granted by the other justices, see Justice McCaleb's major-
ity opinion at the first hearing, 45 So. 2d 891, 892, and Justice LeBlanc's con-
curring opinion on the second rehearing, 45 So. 2d 891, 895.
29. La. Act 17 of 1935 (1 E.S.) §§ 2, 3.
30. 45 So. 2d 891, 893.
31. La. Act 372 of 1948 (La. R.S. [1950] 26:583-595).
32. The 1948 statute covered the same subject matter as the 1935 act, and
Section 17 expressly stated, "All laws or parts of laws on the same subject
matter or in conflict herewith are hereby repealed." A comparison of the two
acts clearly indicates that the 1948 statute was intended to replace the 1935
statute.
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Tiger Act as meaning "a surreptitious concealment or that which
is not visible to the naked eye" and pointed out that there had
been no concealment of intoxicating liquor by the druggist in the
instant case.3 3 Such a holding as to the scope and application of
the Blind Tiger Act will not preclude the possibility of convic-
tions for violation of the provisions of the Local Option Statute.
The propriety of convicting a druggist under the 1948 Local
Option Law for sales upon a licensed physician's prescription and
for purely medicinal purposes is a matter which was not raised




Notice of loss--direct action. The nature of the direct action
against the insurance company originally authorized by Louisi-
ana Act 253 of 1918 has been the subject of extended litigation.'
As amended by Louisiana Act 55 of 1930, the statute provides for
a direct action by any injured person against the defendant's
insurer and states that "any action brought hereunder shall be
subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy contract and
the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct
action brought by the insured. .. ."
In a series of decisions, the supreme court has held that the
insurer could not avail itself of defenses "personal to the in-
sured."' 2 The statutory phrase quoted above was not involved,
but these decisions did show a clear intention to expand the scope
of the remedy available to the injured third person.
Another group of cases raised a problem which directly con-
cerned these words. Every public liability policy contains a
clause requiring the insured, as a condition of the insurer's lia-
bility, to notify the insurer of any accident. The phrasing of
these clauses varies, but their general purpose is to enable the
insurer as soon as possible after an accident to commence an
investigation and take such other action as it may deem neces-
sary either toward settling the claim or preparing for litigation.
33. 45 So. 2d 891, 895 (La. 1950).
* Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. For a general discussion of this act, see Miller, Aspects of a Public
Liability and Property Damage Policy in Louisiana, 15 Tulane L. Rev. 79
(1940).
2. See, for example, Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 182 La. 171,
161 So. 191 (1935) (action by wife against husband's insurer); Ruiz v. Clancy,
182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1934) (action by minor children for negligence of
their father resulting in death of their mother).
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